A Public Health Laboratory Information System in Support of Health Emergencies: The Nebraska Public Health Laboratory COVID-19 Experience.

OBJECTIVES: Public health laboratories (PHLs) are essential components of US Public Health Service operations. The health information technology that supports PHLs is central to effective and efficient laboratory operations and overall public health response to infectious disease management. This analysis presents key information on how the Nebraska Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) information technology system evolved to meet the demands of the COVID-19 pandemic. MATERIALS AND METHODS: COVID-19 presented numerous, unforeseen information technology system challenges. The most notable challenges requiring changes to NPHL software systems and capability were improving efficiency of the laboratory operation due to high-volume testing, responding daily to demands for timely data for analysis by partner systems, interfacing with multiple testing (equipment) platforms, and supporting community-based specimen collection programs. RESULTS: Improvements to the NPHL information technology system enabled NPHL to perform >121 000 SARS-CoV-2 polymerase chain reaction tests from March 2020 through January 2022 at a sustainable rate of 2000 SARS-CoV-2 tests per day, with no increase in laboratory staffing. Electronic reporting of 62 000 rapid antigen tests eliminated paper reporting and extended testing services throughout the state. Collection of COVID-19 symptom data before specimen collection enabled NPHL to make data-driven decisions to perform pool testing and conserve testing kits when supplies were low. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: NPHL information technology applications proved essential for managing health care provider workload, prioritizing the use of scarce testing supplies, and managing Nebraska's overall pandemic response. The NPHL experience provides useful examples of a highly capable information technology system and suggests areas for additional attention in the PHL environment, including a focus on end users, collaboration with various partners, and investment in information technology.

Outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Nursing Homes during Periods of Delta and Omicron Predominance, United States, July 2021-March 2022.

SARS-CoV-2 infections among vaccinated nursing home residents increased after the Omicron variant emerged. Data on booster dose effectiveness in this population are limited. During July 2021-March 2022, nursing home outbreaks in 11 US jurisdictions involving >3 infections within 14 days among residents who had received at least the primary COVID-19 vaccine(s) were monitored. Among 2,188 nursing homes, 1,247 outbreaks were reported in the periods of Delta (n = 356, 29%), mixed Delta/Omicron (n = 354, 28%), and Omicron (n = 536, 43%) predominance. During the Omicron-predominant period, the risk for infection within 14 days of an outbreak start was lower among boosted residents than among residents who had received the primary vaccine series alone (risk ratio [RR] 0.25, 95% CI 0.19-0.33). Once infected, boosted residents were at lower risk for all-cause hospitalization (RR 0.48, 95% CI 0.40-0.49) and death (RR 0.45, 95% CI 0.34-0.59) than primary vaccine-only residents.

Probable vertical transmission of Alpha variant of concern (B.1.1.7) with evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the syncytiotrophoblast, a case report.

Introduction: Definitive vertical transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection has been rarely reported. We present a case of a third trimester pregnancy with fetal distress necessitating cesarean section that demonstrated maternal, placental, and infant infection with the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant/B.1.1.7. Methods: CDC's Influenza SARS-CoV-2 Multiplex RT-PCR Assay was used to test for SARS-CoV-2 in a maternal NP swab, maternal plasma, infant NP swab, and formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded (FFPE) placental tissue specimens. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on maternal plasma, infant, and placental specimens to determine the SARS-CoV-2 genotype. Histopathological evaluation, SARS-CoV-2 immunohistochemistry testing (IHC), and electron microscopy (EM) analysis were performed on placenta, umbilical cord, and membrane FFPE blocks. Results: All specimens tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR. WGS further revealed identical SARS-CoV-2 sequences from clade 20I/501Y.V1 (lineage Alpha/B.1.1.7) in maternal plasma, infant, and placental specimens. Histopathologic evaluation of the placenta showed histiocytic and neutrophilic intervillositis with fibrin deposition and trophoblast necrosis with positive SARS-CoV-2 immunostaining in the syncytiotrophoblast and electron microscopy evidence of coronavirus. Discussion: These findings suggest vertical transmission of SARS-CoV-2, supported by clinical course timing, identical SARS-CoV-2 genotypes from maternal, placental, and infant samples, and IHC and EM evidence of placental infection. However, determination of the timing or distinction between prepartum and peripartum SARS-CoV-2 transmission remains unclear.

Outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta Variant) in a Youth Camp Associated With Community Spread, Nebraska, June-July 2021.

OBJECTIVES: During June-July 2021, an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 occurred among attendees of a summer youth camp in Nebraska. We assessed the factors that contributed to onward transmission of disease. METHODS: The Four Corners Health Department conducted an outbreak investigation and recorded both laboratory-confirmed and self-reported cases of SARS-CoV-2 and mitigation measures employed. We generated sequences on positive specimens, created an epidemic curve to assist with outbreak visualization, and examined epidemiologic, genomic, and laboratory outcomes. RESULTS: Evaluation of 3 index cases led to the identification of 25 people with COVID-19 who interacted directly with the camp. Contact tracing revealed an additional 18 cases consistent with onward community transmission. Most (24 of 35, 68.5%) vaccine-eligible community cases were not vaccinated. We sequenced 8 positive specimens; all were identified as the Delta variant. Precamp planning incorporated local health officials who recommended wearing face masks, practicing social distancing, and using attendee cohorts to limit mixing of people involved in various activities. CONCLUSION: Low vaccination levels and poor face mask-wearing habits among attendees resulted in secondary and tertiary spread of SARS-CoV-2 and severe outcomes among young adults. This outbreak of COVID-19 at a youth camp highlights the importance of vaccination and use of other measures to interrupt opportunities for SARS-CoV-2 spread in the community and shows that vaccinated people remain vulnerable to infection when in an environment of high exposure to SARS-CoV-2. Proactive case identification and interruption of chains of transmission can help decrease the number of cases and avoid further severe outcomes.

Probable vertical transmission of Alpha variant of concern (B.1.1.7) with evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the syncytiotrophoblast, a case report

Introduction Definitive vertical transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection has been rarely reported. We present a case of a third trimester pregnancy with fetal distress necessitating cesarean section that demonstrated maternal, placental, and infant infection with the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant/B.1.1.7. Methods CDC's Influenza SARS-CoV-2 Multiplex RT-PCR Assay was used to test for SARS-CoV-2 in a maternal NP swab, maternal plasma, infant NP swab, and formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded (FFPE) placental tissue specimens. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on maternal plasma, infant, and placental specimens to determine the SARS-CoV-2 genotype. Histopathological evaluation, SARS-CoV-2 immunohistochemistry testing (IHC), and electron microscopy (EM) analysis were performed on placenta, umbilical cord, and membrane FFPE blocks. Results All specimens tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR. WGS further revealed identical SARS-CoV-2 sequences from clade 20I/501Y.V1 (lineage Alpha/B.1.1.7) in maternal plasma, infant, and placental specimens. Histopathologic evaluation of the placenta showed histiocytic and neutrophilic intervillositis with fibrin deposition and trophoblast necrosis with positive SARS-CoV-2 immunostaining in the syncytiotrophoblast and electron microscopy evidence of coronavirus. Discussion These findings suggest vertical transmission of SARS-CoV-2, supported by clinical course timing, identical SARS-CoV-2 genotypes from maternal, placental, and infant samples, and IHC and EM evidence of placental infection. However, determination of the timing or distinction between prepartum and peripartum SARS-CoV-2 transmission remains unclear.

Investigation of a SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) Variant Cluster - Nebraska, November-December 2021.

The B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) was first detected in specimens collected on November 11, 2021, in Botswana and on November 14 in South Africa;* the first confirmed case of Omicron in the United States was identified in California on December 1, 2021 (1). On November 29, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services was notified of six probable cases† of COVID-19 in one household, including one case in a man aged 48 years (the index patient) who had recently returned from Nigeria. Given the patient's travel history, Omicron infection was suspected. Specimens from all six persons in the household tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing on December 1, and the following day genomic sequencing by the Nebraska Public Health Laboratory identified an identical Omicron genotype from each specimen (Figure). Phylogenetic analysis was conducted to determine if this cluster represented an independent introduction of Omicron into the United States, and a detailed epidemiologic investigation was conducted. This activity was reviewed by CDC and was conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.§.

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in the US, 2020.

Importance: Contact tracing is a multistep process to limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Gaps in the process result in missed opportunities to prevent COVID-19. Objective: To quantify proportions of cases and their contacts reached by public health authorities and the amount of time needed to reach them and to compare the risk of a positive COVID-19 test result between contacts and the general public during 4-week assessment periods. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study took place at 13 health departments and 1 Indian Health Service Unit in 11 states and 1 tribal nation. Participants included all individuals with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 and their named contacts. Local COVID-19 surveillance data were used to determine the numbers of persons reported to have laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 who were interviewed and named contacts between June and October 2020. Main Outcomes and Measures: For contacts, the numbers who were identified, notified of their exposure, and agreed to monitoring were calculated. The median time from index case specimen collection to contact notification was calculated, as were numbers of named contacts subsequently notified of their exposure and monitored. The prevalence of a positive SARS-CoV-2 test among named and tested contacts was compared with that jurisdiction's general population during the same 4 weeks. Results: The total number of cases reported was 74 185. Of these, 43 931 (59%) were interviewed, and 24 705 (33%) named any contacts. Among the 74 839 named contacts, 53 314 (71%) were notified of their exposure, and 34 345 (46%) agreed to monitoring. A mean of 0.7 contacts were reached by telephone by public health authorities, and only 0.5 contacts per case were monitored. In general, health departments reporting large case counts during the assessment (≥5000) conducted smaller proportions of case interviews and contact notifications. In 9 locations, the median time from specimen collection to contact notification was 6 days or less. In 6 of 8 locations with population comparison data, positive test prevalence was higher among named contacts than the general population. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study of US local COVID-19 surveillance data, testing named contacts was a high-yield activity for case finding. However, this assessment suggests that contact tracing had suboptimal impact on SARS-CoV-2 transmission, largely because 2 of 3 cases were either not reached for interview or named no contacts when interviewed. These findings are relevant to decisions regarding the allocation of public health resources among the various prevention strategies and for the prioritization of case investigations and contact tracing efforts.

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission among Meat Processing Workers in Nebraska, USA, and Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Measures.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has severely impacted the meat processing industry in the United States. We sought to detail demographics and outcomes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infections among workers in Nebraska meat processing facilities and determine the effects of initiating universal mask policies and installing physical barriers at 13 meat processing facilities. During April 1-July 31, 2020, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 5,002 Nebraska meat processing workers (attack rate 19%). After initiating both universal masking and physical barrier interventions, 8/13 facilities showed a statistically significant reduction in COVID-19 incidence in <10 days. Characteristics and incidence of confirmed cases aligned with many nationwide trends becoming apparent during this pandemic: specifically, high attack rates among meat processing industry workers, disproportionately high risk of adverse outcomes among ethnic and racial minority groups and men, and effectiveness of using multiple prevention and control interventions to reduce disease transmission.

Coronavirus Disease among Workers in Food Processing, Food Manufacturing, and Agriculture Workplaces.

We describe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US food manufacturing and agriculture workers and provide updated information on meat and poultry processing workers. Among 742 food and agriculture workplaces in 30 states, 8,978 workers had confirmed COVID-19; 55 workers died. Racial and ethnic minority workers could be disproportionately affected by COVID-19.

Enhanced contact investigations for nine early travel-related cases of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. In response to the first cases identified in the United States, close contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases were investigated to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified and monitored daily for development of symptoms (active monitoring). Selected close contacts (including those with exposures categorized as higher risk) were targeted for collection of additional exposure information and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Four hundred four close contacts were actively monitored in the jurisdictions that managed the travel-related cases. Three hundred thirty-eight of the 404 close contacts provided at least basic exposure information, of whom 159 close contacts had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all actively monitored close contacts, two additional symptomatic COVID-19 cases (i.e., secondary cases) were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. When considering only household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested for SARS-CoV-2, the secondary attack rate (i.e., the number of secondary cases as a proportion of total close contacts) was 13% (95% CI: 4-38%). The results from these contact tracing investigations suggest that household members, especially significant others, of COVID-19 cases are at highest risk of becoming infected. The importance of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers is also underlined. Isolation of persons with COVID-19, in combination with quarantine of exposed close contacts and practice of everyday preventive behaviors, is important to mitigate spread of COVID-19.

COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities - United States, February-April 2020.

An estimated 2.1 million U.S. adults are housed within approximately 5,000 correctional and detention facilities† on any given day (1). Many facilities face significant challenges in controlling the spread of highly infectious pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Such challenges include crowded dormitories, shared lavatories, limited medical and isolation resources, daily entry and exit of staff members and visitors, continual introduction of newly incarcerated or detained persons, and transport of incarcerated or detained persons in multiperson vehicles for court-related, medical, or security reasons (2,3). During April 22-28, 2020, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases were reported to CDC by 37 of 54 state and territorial health department jurisdictions. Thirty-two (86%) jurisdictions reported at least one laboratory-confirmed case from a total of 420 correctional and detention facilities. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,893 incarcerated or detained persons and 2,778 facility staff members, resulting in 88 deaths in incarcerated or detained persons and 15 deaths among staff members. Prompt identification of COVID-19 cases and consistent application of prevention measures, such as symptom screening and quarantine, are critical to protecting incarcerated and detained persons and staff members.